Vavilov and Indigenous self-government
There has been optimism that Pastion v Dene Tha’ First Nation makes space for Indigenous self-government within Canada’s administrative state. Post-Vavilov, courts will be reviewing the reasons of decision-makers with heightened scrutiny. Could this cut into the sphere of deference carved out by Pastion for Indigenous decision-makers? I think it does not.
The Court in Vavilov lists various factors that inform the scope of what is reasonable: the statutory scheme, common law, international law, evidence, submissions, past practice, etc. While Pastion recognized a mandate to give “deference towards Indigenous decision-makers tasked with applying Indigenous laws,” Indigenous law is not mentioned by the Court at all in Vavilov. But I think Vavilov leaves the holding in Pastion untouched.
First, the Court did not claim to be presenting an exhaustive list of factors and emphasized that “each decision must be [justified and evaluated] in relation to its own particular context.”
Second, courts are also not to assume that they are the target audience of the reasons. “[T]he decision must... be justified... to those to whom the decision applies... [E]xercise of public power must be justified, intelligible and transparent, not in the abstract, but to the individuals subject to it.”
And last, paragraph 93 of Vavilov echos paragraph 22 of Pastion:
An administrative decision maker may demonstrate through its reasons that a given decision was made by bringing that institutional expertise and experience to bear. In conducting reasonableness review, judges should be attentive to the application by decision makers of specialized knowledge, as demonstrated by their reasons. Respectful attention to a decision maker’s demonstrated expertise may reveal to a reviewing court that an outcome that might be puzzling or counterintuitive on its face nevertheless accords with the purposes and practical realities of the relevant administrative regime and represents a reasonable approach given the consequences and the operational impact of the decision. This demonstrated experience and expertise may also explain why a given issue is treated in less detail. (Vavilov at para 93.)
Many forms of knowledge may be grouped under the heading of “expertise.” Indigenous decision-makers are obviously in a better position than non-Indigenous courts to understand Indigenous legal traditions. They are particularly well-placed to understand the purposes that Indigenous laws pursue. They are also sensitive to Indigenous experience generally and to the conditions of the particular nation or community involved in the decision. They may be able to take judicial notice of facts that are obvious and indisputable to the members of that particular community or nation, which this Court may be unaware of. Indeed, for many Indigenous peoples, a person is best placed to make a decision if that person has close knowledge of the situation at issue. (Pastion at para 22.)
Notes
1. ↑ Pastion v Dene Tha’ First Nation, 2018 FC 648.
2. ↑ I acknowledge that this optimism is necessarily limited by the fact that the government structures that are afforded power through the administrative state are still Canadian-created and controlled. See Chelsea Vowel, “The myth of the corrupt chief and band council (Part I)”, âpihtawikosisân (15 February 2016). See also Catherine Bell & Robert Paterson, eds, Protection of First Nations Cultural Heritage: Laws, Policy, and Reform (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009) (“even when Western law is used as a tool to empower [I]ndigenous peoples, it captures their law” at 14).
3. ↑ Although, not literally a range.
4. ↑ Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 (“[i]t is unnecessary to catalogue all of the legal or factual considerations that could constrain an administrative decision maker in a particular case” at para 106).
5. ↑ Ibid at para 90.
6. ↑ Ibid at paras 86, 95.