The science of solitary confinement

By Sancho McCann · , edited:

Used with per­mis­sion from Raymond Palmore. Drawn dur­ing his time at Corcoran State Prison.

CBC’s Quirks and Quarks had a seg­ment this week about the psy­chol­o­gy of soli­tary confinement. Bob McDonald in­ter­viewed Dr. Craig Haney, one of the ex­pert wit­ness­es in the BC Supreme Court case that re­sult­ed in por­tions of Canada’s soli­tary-confinement regime be­ing struck down as un­con­sti­tu­tion­al.,

This is a short com­ment on that case, British Columbia Civil Liberties Association v Canada (Attorney General) (BCCLA v Canada), fo­cus­ing on the judge’s han­dling of the scientific ev­i­dence.

Context

This case turned on the judge’s un­der­stand­ing of nu­anced scientific ar­gu­ments be­tween ex­perts with com­pet­ing opin­ions. The scientific ev­i­dence was es­sen­tial to the judge’s finding that the way that we cur­rent­ly use soli­tary confinement “places all Canadian fed­er­al in­mates sub­ject to it at significant risk of se­ri­ous psy­cho­log­i­cal harm, in­clud­ing men­tal pain and suffering, and in­creased in­ci­dence of self-harm and sui­cide.”

I did not lis­ten to or read tran­scripts of the tes­ti­mo­ny of the scientific ex­perts in this case. This com­ment is based only on the pre­sen­ta­tion of the ev­i­dence by Justice Leask in his writ­ten de­ci­sion. In the fol­low­ing, I as­sume that he has giv­en a fair pre­sen­ta­tion of that ev­i­dence. I am not a psy­chol­o­gist, but I am a sci­en­tist. I un­der­stand ev­i­dence, ex­per­i­ments, sta­tis­ti­cal tests and pow­er, cau­sa­tion, and the strengths and weak­ness­es of meta-analy­ses and sys­tem­at­ic re­views.

My take on the evidence as presented

Plaintiff’s experts

The ev­i­dence sup­ports a claim that soli­tary confinement caus­es var­i­ous harm­ful effects. There is a large body of clin­i­cal and ex­per­i­men­tal re­search es­tab­lish­ing that when you re­strict a per­son’s en­vi­ron­men­tal and so­cial stim­u­la­tion, they suffer. Dr. Grassian has ob­served, in pris­on­ers in soli­tary confinement, a rare confluence of psy­chi­atric symp­toms which we al­ready know can be caused by re­strict­ing en­vi­ron­men­tal and so­cial stim­u­la­tion. There is a cor­re­la­tion with the on­set of the in­ter­ven­tion: in­tro­duc­tion of soli­tary confinement pre­dictably shifts EEG pat­terns to­wards that char­ac­ter­is­tic of stu­por and delir­i­um. Psychiatric dis­tur­bances spring up anew when pris­on­ers are seg­re­gat­ed. When the seg­re­gat­ed confinement is pro­longed, there is a high­er in­ci­dence of psy­chosis.

Further (and this re­lates to how we should view the gov­ern­ment’s ev­i­dence), the na­ture of soli­tary confinement and the psy­chi­atric symp­toms make self-re­port­ing a poor mea­sure of effects. Prisoners will avoid ac­knowl­edg­ing psy­cho­log­i­cal harm out of spite against au­thor­i­ties whom they see as try­ing to “break them down”. Psychotic dis­tur­bances of­ten have a dis­so­cia­tive char­ac­ter: in­di­vid­u­als of­ten do not re­call events which oc­curred dur­ing con­fu­sion­al psy­chosis.

Dr. Grassian’s ev­i­dence must be seen in the con­text of the Bradford Hill cri­te­ria (use­ful for as­sess­ing cau­sa­tion from epi­demi­o­log­i­cal ev­i­dence). In the case of soli­tary confinement, it would not be eth­i­cal to per­form a ran­dom­ized con­trolled tri­al. The gov­ern­ment’s ex­perts, Dr. Mills and Dr. Gendreau, point to the in­abil­i­ty to de­duce cau­sa­tion from this re­search. While this may be true, due to the lack of di­rect ex­per­i­men­tal ev­i­dence, the Bradford Hill cri­te­ria give guid­ance for mak­ing (ab­duc­tive) in­fer­ences in spite of this.

The harm­ful effects are con­sis­tent across pop­u­la­tions, the effects hap­pen af­ter the pur­port­ed cause, there is a bi­o­log­i­cal gra­di­ent (longer ex­po­sure is as­so­ci­at­ed with high­er in­ci­dence), there is a plau­si­ble mech­a­nism for the cau­sa­tion, and the hy­poth­e­sis is con­sis­tent with lab­o­ra­to­ry ex­per­i­ments on de­pri­va­tion of en­vi­ron­men­tal and so­cial stim­u­lus. This confluence of ev­i­dence sup­ports an ab­duc­tive in­fer­ence that soli­tary confinement caus­es the harm­ful effects.

Government’s experts

The con­clu­sions drawn by the gov­ern­ment ex­perts are not con­sis­tent with the ev­i­dence they claim to base it on. They look to low-pow­er ob­ser­va­tion­al stud­ies that used sub­jec­tive self-re­port­ing as a mea­sure. These stud­ies have a poor abil­i­ty to de­tect an effect even if an effect were to be present. Because these stud­ies failed to find an effect, the gov­ern­ment ex­perts con­clud­ed that there was no effect (“seg­re­gat­ed in­mates with­out men­tal ill­ness do not ex­pe­ri­ence de­bil­i­tat­ing psy­cho­log­i­cal or psy­chi­atric symp­toms due to their place­ment in seg­re­ga­tion”), or an effect of low­er mag­ni­tude than ar­gued by the plaintiffs (“that it is much milder than that pre­dict­ed by the plaintiffs’ ex­perts”), but these con­clu­sions can­not be drawn from a neg­a­tive re­sults in low-pow­ered stud­ies.

Suedfeld et al (1982), a study re­lied upon by the gov­ern­ment, gives con­tra­dic­to­ry and weak ev­i­dence. “A re­la­tion­ship was found be­tween the length of stay and mea­sures of de­pres­sion and hos­til­i­ty” (a dose-re­sponse re­la­tion­ship; one of the Bradford Hill cri­te­ria that points in favour of finding an effect). But be­cause of the small mag­ni­tude of the ob­served effect, the au­thors of that study gave a mea­sured con­clu­sion: it “did not sup­port the claim that soli­tary confinement […] was over­whelm­ing­ly aver­sive, stress­ful, or dam­ag­ing to in­mates.” Again, this is just fail­ure to find ev­i­dence for the effect, not pos­i­tive ev­i­dence against the effect.

The gov­ern­ment ex­perts pushed the court to rely on lon­gi­tu­di­nal stud­ies, which are more like an ex­per­i­ment in that they ob­serve what hap­pens be­fore and af­ter the on­set of an in­ter­ven­tion. They be­lieve the “Zinger study” to be worth significant weight. The pop­u­la­tion for this study was 83 seg­re­gat­ed plus 53 gen­er­al-pop­u­la­tion pris­on­ers. The seg­re­gat­ed pop­u­la­tion ini­tial­ly re­port­ed more de­pres­sive symp­toms, but not on a mea­sure of hope­less­ness. Both seg­re­gat­ed and non-seg­re­gat­ed pris­on­ers im­proved over the 60 days of the study on mea­sures of de­pres­sion, anx­i­ety, hope­less­ness, and psy­cho­log­i­cal ad­just­ment. The fact that both pop­u­la­tions im­proved over the 60-day study is in­ter­est­ing scientifically. It puts into ques­tion whether the fact of ob­ser­va­tion on its own had an effect on the pop­u­la­tion or on their re­port­ing. Perhaps when pris­on­ers re­ceive in­creased at­ten­tion from oth­ers re­gard­ing their well-be­ing and are asked to per­form mean­ing­ful in­tro­spec­tion and tell some­one about, they feel bet­ter. Or maybe the par­tic­i­pants felt a sub­con­scious pres­sure to re­port im­prove­ment. Without blind­ing, this kind of ob­serv­er effect is com­mon.

Of course, a lon­gi­tu­di­nal study that tracks the re­sponse to an in­ter­ven­tion over time has the po­ten­tial to be more use­ful scientifically than a set of clin­i­cal ob­ser­va­tions as pre­sent­ed by Dr. Grassian, but the Zinger study has method­olog­i­cal weak­ness­es that make its neg­a­tive finding un­sur­pris­ing and definitely not pos­i­tive ev­i­dence for the claim that there is no effect.

Another study that the gov­ern­ment ex­perts em­pha­sized was a pair of meta-analy­ses by Morgan and Gendreau. Meta-analy­ses (and sys­tem­at­ic re­views es­pe­cial­ly) can be a great tool for eval­u­at­ing an en­tire body of ev­i­dence gen­er­at­ed by many sep­a­rate re­search teams. By pool­ing to­geth­er par­tic­i­pants, meta-analy­ses can find effects when in­di­vid­ual stud­ies were too small to find one. They can tease out pat­terns of a de­creas­ing effect size with in­creased rig­or (a mark­er of there be­ing only a small or no effect). They can de­tect pub­li­ca­tion bias (where re­search teams across an en­tire field with­hold stud­ies that don’t show sta­tis­ti­cal­ly significant effect).

Paragraph 206 sum­ma­rizes the Morgan and Gendreau stud­ies: “the two stud­ies […] found that the differences be­tween seg­re­gat­ed and non-seg­re­gat­ed in­mates ranged from small to mod­er­ate on a wide range of psy­cho­log­i­cal in­di­ca­tors.” But, they also found that “the size of these differences were significantly re­duced when only the stud­ies rat­ed as more scientifically rig­or­ous were con­sid­ered.” As I men­tioned above, this pat­tern in a body of re­search is an in­di­ca­tor of a small or non-ex­is­tent effect. But, us­ing this move de­pends on an ac­cu­rate as­sess­ment of a study’s scientific rig­or, and Dr. Grassian, one of the plaintiff’s ex­perts, crit­i­cized the se­lec­tion cri­te­ria for the Morgan study.

Regardless, the gov­ern­ment ex­pert con­cludes: “the findings do not sup­port the no­tion that, as a group, in­mates in seg­re­ga­tion suffer […] when com­pared with in­mates out­side of seg­re­ga­tion.”

Two things are im­por­tant from this con­clu­sion. It is a con­clu­sion “as a group”. And again, even tak­en at face val­ue, it is only a fail­ure to find pos­i­tive ev­i­dence for the effect, not pos­i­tive ev­i­dence that there is no effect. With an effect that might vary with­in spe­cial­ized sub­pop­u­la­tions, and sub­jec­tive psy­cho­log­i­cal mea­sures in­volv­ing self-re­port­ing that the par­tic­i­pants may have mo­ti­va­tions or in­cen­tives for hid­ing, it isn’t un­ex­pect­ed that a meta-analy­sis would find no ev­i­dence for an effect.

Last, the gov­ern­ment re­lies on the “Colorado Study”. But, there is one crit­i­cism of the study that is so fa­tal to its rel­e­vance that I will not even present its re­sults. The study re­lied on self-re­port­ing scales. But, the cor­rec­tions staff also kept ob­jec­tive data in the form of psy­chi­atric cri­sis records (for self-harm, sui­cide, psy­chot­ic dis­tur­bances). These cri­sis records square­ly con­tra­dict­ed the pris­on­ers’ self-re­port­ing. According to the self-re­port scales, there was no de­te­ri­o­ra­tion with­in the seg­re­gat­ed pop­u­la­tion over the course of 12 months. The cri­sis records show the op­po­site. Only 12 episodes oc­curred in the first six months; 25 oc­curred in the sec­ond six months.

The method­olog­i­cal weak­ness­es in both the “Colorado study” and the “Zinger study” also affect the rel­e­vance of the Morgan and Gendreau meta-analy­sis be­cause they were both in­clud­ed in the small set of stud­ies meet­ing the se­lec­tion cri­te­ria, and the “Colorado study” was one of the stud­ies identified to be weight­ed as hav­ing a “stronger” qual­i­ty de­sign.

Discussion

This is a difficult scientific ques­tion. The plaintiff’s ex­perts do not point to ev­i­dence that ex­per­i­men­tal­ly es­tab­lish­es a causal link be­tween soli­tary confinement and psy­cho­log­i­cal harm. They do, how­ev­er, point to a confluence of ev­i­dence that, when viewed in light of the Bradford Hill cri­te­ria, strong­ly sug­gests an effect.

The ev­i­dence pre­sent­ed by the gov­ern­ment is based on meth­ods that have the po­ten­tial to be more re­veal­ing. However, due to method­olog­i­cal weak­ness­es in­volved in the specific ap­pli­ca­tions of those meth­ods, this ev­i­dence is ac­tu­al­ly not re­veal­ing.

I have em­pha­sized the dis­tinc­tion be­tween (1) fail­ing to find an effect and (2) finding pos­i­tive ev­i­dence that there is no effect. Of course, one can­not prove a neg­a­tive; fail­ure to find pos­i­tive ev­i­dence that there is no effect should not be fa­tal to any counter-ev­i­dence. But, when you present a study that you in­tend to negate the claim that there is an effect, that study should at least have been set up to be able to find an effect if the effect ex­ists. That is, the study should be high pow­ered. Failure to find an effect in a high pow­er study can be very com­pelling ev­i­dence.

That is a tricky dis­tinc­tion and I am im­pressed that Justice Leask saw it. In this case, ev­i­dence that was ob­tained by meth­ods that are gen­er­al­ly less ro­bust was owed more weight than ev­i­dence ob­tained by meth­ods that are gen­er­al­ly more ro­bust.

In a Section 7 chal­lenge, the plaintiffs only need to show a “sufficient causal con­nec­tion” be­tween the gov­ern­ment ac­tion and the harm. They don’t need to show that soli­tary confinement is “the only or the dom­i­nant cause” of the harms. And, they only need to es­tab­lish “a rea­son­able in­fer­ence, drawn on a bal­ance of prob­a­bil­i­ties.” Justice Leask found that the plaintiffs met that bur­den.

Related media

End Solitary Confinement–BobbyLee’s Story”, BC Civil Liberties Association (26 May 2016).

Susan Haack, Defending Science–with­in Reason (Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, 2007).

Susan Haack, “Of Truth, in Science and in Law” (2008) 73:3 Brooklyn Law Review 985.

Craig Haney, “Restricting the Use of Solitary Confinement” (2017) 1 Annual Review of Criminology 285.

Treacy Ziegler, “Memory of Space”, The Prison Arts Coalition (15 October 2014).

Treacy Ziegler, “The art of ab­solute lone­li­ness”, Broad Street Review (3 June 2014).